Outlook and appraisal [December 2016] by Roy, Graeme
Strathprints Institutional Repository
Roy, Graeme (2016) Outlook and appraisal [December 2016]. Fraser of 
Allander Economic Commentary, 40 (3). pp. 4-26. ISSN 2046-5378 , 
This version is available at http://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/59107/
Strathprints is  designed  to  allow  users  to  access  the  research  output  of  the  University  of 
Strathclyde. Unless otherwise explicitly stated on the manuscript, Copyright © and Moral Rights 
for the papers on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. 
Please check the manuscript for details of any other licences that may have been applied. You 
may  not  engage  in  further  distribution  of  the  material  for  any  profitmaking  activities  or  any 
commercial gain. You may freely distribute both the url (http://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/) and the 
content of this paper for research or private study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes without 
prior permission or charge. 
Any  correspondence  concerning  this  service  should  be  sent  to  Strathprints  administrator: 
strathprints@strath.ac.uk
Fraser of Allander Institute Economic Commentary, December 2016  
1 
 
At a glance 
 
x There remains a high degree of uncertainty around near-WHUPIRUHFDVWVIRU6FRWODQG¶V
economy in the light of the EU referendum outcome.   
 
x On balance, we continue to forecast a weak outlook with growth below trend to 2019.  This is 
on the back of continued growth in the 2nd half of 2016, albeit at a slow pace. We expect the 
economy to have grown by around 1% this year, well below the UK.  
 
x But the UK economy has held up well since June and this momentum is likely to spill-over into 
2017 allowing us to make a welcome upward revision to our Scottish outlook. Moreover the 
fall in Sterling, Bank of England stimulus, signs that the UK will press for a transition and not a 
µFliff-HGJH¶ZKHQOHDYLQJWKH6LQJOH0DUNHWDQGDVOLJKWO\OHVVSHVVLPLVWLFHQYLURQPHQWIRUWKH
North Sea, have all helped to improve the near-term outlook relative to our July forecasts.  
 
x However, these effects will only partially mitigate ± rather than fully offset ± the challenges 
posed by Brexit. Consumption and investment growth are likely to slow significantly in 2017 
and 2018 relative to our pre-referendum forecasts. Unemployment will be higher and earnings 
will be lower with working households feeling the pinch.   
 
x Our central forecast is for growth of 1.1% in 2017, 1.3% in 2018 and 1.6% in 2019 ± a revision 
of around +0.15 % points per quarter for 2017. However, these could change materially under 
different circumstances. During these uncertain times we recommend that just as much focus 
is given to the full range of estimates that underpin this outlook as to any specific estimates.  
 
 
FAI forecast Scottish GVA growth (%) by sector, 2016 to 2019 
 
2016 2017 2018 2019 
GVA 1.0 1.1 1.3 1.6 
Production 1.4 1.3 1.5 1.8 
Construction 0.5 0.7 0.8 0.9 
Services 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.5 
 
 
 
Forecast Scottish unemployment, 2017 to 2019 
2017 2018 2019 
Unemployment  151,100 155,750 166,400 
Rate (%)1 5.6 5.7 5.9 
Note: Rounded to the nearest 50. 1 = Rate calculated as total ILO 
unemployment by total economically active population 16+. 
 
 
Source: Fraser of Allander Institute  
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Summary 
The Scottish economy returned to growth 
during the second quarter of 2016, and most 
indicators suggest that growth has continued 
± albeit at a relatively slow pace ± through 
the remainder of the year.  
Employment in Scotland remains close to 
record levels.  
However, Scotland continues to lag the UK 
ZLWK6FRWODQG¶VUHFHQWJURZWKUDWHMXVWRI
that in the UK. We expect Scotland to have 
grown by around 1% this year, broadly in 
line with our July forecast.  
Whilst unemployment has fallen sharply 
recently, this appears to stem, not from 
people finding work, but from people exiting 
the labour force. 
With new tax powers coming on-stream in 
April, it is vital that the gap with the UK is 
closed.  
Overall, the UK economy has held up well 
since the EU referendum. There are a 
number of reasons for this.  
Firstly, stronger than expected growth in 
early 2016 has helped propel the economy 
through the summer and autumn 
uncertainty.   
Secondly, sentiment was boosted by the 
larger than anticipated stimulus from the 
Bank of England ± which included a further 
cut in interest rates.  
Thirdly, the value of Sterling has fallen 
sharply. In the short-term, this is supporting 
exporters and boosting overseas income, 
but at the cost of higher inflation.   
Fourthly and arguably most importantly, the 
immediate risk during July and August was a 
sharp loss of confidence. After an uncertain 
start, the UK Government ± supported by 
the Bank of England ± has acted swiftly to 
counter any threats to overall 
macroeconomic stability. Moreover, the 
signals that the government will seek a 
WUDQVLWLRQUDWKHUWKDQDµFOLII-HGJH¶H[LWIURP
the Single Market has allowed businesses to 
press on with day-to-day activities.  
But earnings are down and productivity 
remains dire. The public finances have been 
hit with additional borrowing of £120bn now 
forecast by 2020-21. 
The outlook for the North Sea is marginally 
more positive than in July. Tentative signs of 
a stabilisation in confidence, coupled with a 
rise in the oil price from its early 2016 low, 
offer a glimmer of hope for 2017.  
It should be noted that, while the recent 
positive developments in the UK economy 
are to be welcomed, they will only partially 
mitigate ± rather than fully offset ± the 
challenges of Brexit. 
Brexit poses questions about the 
fundamental structure of our economy and 
these will take time to emerge and feed 
through to the hard economic data.  
Our expectation is that growth will remain 
below trend through the forecast period.  
Our central forecast is for growth of 1.1% in 
2017, 1.3% in 2018 and 1.6% in 2019. 
Unemployment is likely to rise in 2017 and 
earnings growth will remain weak.  
But there remains a considerable degree of 
uncertainty around forecasts in the current 
climate. If, for example, the process for 
triggering Article 50 is delayed or there is a 
hit to economic confidence, then this could 
have a material impact on the outlook.    
 
 
Fraser of Allander Institute 
December 2016 
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Outlook and Appraisal 
 
The Scottish economy returned to growth in Q2 2016 and growth is expected to have 
been sustained through the year. But annual growth in the twelve months to June of 
just 0.7% (vs. 2.2% for the UK) remains disappointing. Economic prospects remain 
highly uncertain as the UK prepares to negotiate to leave the EU  
Table 1: Scottish GDP growth (%) by sector, Q2 2016 
 
GDP Agriculture Production Construction Services 
Quarterly 
Growth 
 
 
+0.4 +0.9 +0.3 -1.9 +0.5 
UK  
 
+0.7 -1.0 +2.1 -0.1 +0.6 
Annual 
Growth 
 
 
+0.7 +1.9 -2.9 -4.5 +2.0 
UK +2.2 -0.7 +1.6 +0.4 +2.7 
Source: Scottish Government
 
 
Table 2: UK labour market, Jul-Sep 2016 
 
Employment 
(16-64) 
Unemployment 
(16+) 
Inactivity 
(16-64) 
Scotland 73.6% 4.7% 22.6% 
England 74.8% 4.8% 21.3% 
Wales 73.1% 4.4% 23.4% 
N. Ire 69.9% 5.6% 25.8% 
UK 74.5% 4.8% 21.7% 
Source: ONS, LFS 
 
 
Chart 1: Independent forecasts for UK growth 2017 
 
Source: HM Treasury
 
 
Introduction 
The Scottish economy grew by +0.4% in Q2 2016 
up from -0.0% in Q1. Most indicators suggest that 
this growth has continued ± albeit at a relatively 
slow pace ± through the 2nd half of the year.  
Despite the ongoing challenges in the oil and gas 
sector, employment in Scotland remains close to 
record levels. Overall, the Scottish economy has 
been relatively resilient to recent headwinds.  
+RZHYHUWKHUHDUHFKDOOHQJHV6FRWODQG¶VJURZWK
rate lags the rest of the UK, whilst the recent fall in 
unemployment stems, not from people finding 
work, but from people exiting the labour force. 
The UK economy has held up well since the EU 
referendum. A number of factors explain this 
resilience, including the larger than expected drop 
in the value of Sterling boosting exports and a bold 
stimulus package from the Bank of England.  
At the same time, the UK economy appears to 
have had greater momentum in the first half of 
2016 than initial data suggested. This has helped 
support growth through a summer and autumn of 
uncertainty. There has also been a marked drop-
off in UK political instability of late.  
However, employment growth has eased, 
productivity and earnings remain weak and 
inflation has picked up.  
Most forecasters have revised down their 
expectations for UK growth in 2017 and 2018, 
albeit the average of these forecasts has risen a 
little since the summer and the range of predicted 
outcomes has narrowed. This, in turn, has an 
impact on our own forecasts for Scotland.  
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Table 3: OECD forecasts for G7 Growth 
 
2016 2017 2018 
UK 2.0 1.2 1.0 
US 1.5 2.3 3.0 
Japan 0.8 1.0 0.8 
Canada 1.2 2.1 2.3 
Euro Area 1.7 1.6 1.7 
Germany 1.7 1.7 1.7 
France 1.2 1.3 1.6 
Italy 0.8 0.9 1.0 
Source: OECD
 
 
Chart 2: European unemployment rates, Q3 2016 
 
Source: Eurostat 
 
 
Chart 3: Rise in global oil prices since start of 2016 
 
 
Source: Thomson Reuters Datastream 
 
 
 
The global economy 
The UK is on track to be the fastest growing G7 
economy in 2016 ± although it is expected to slow 
relative to its competitors in 2017 and 2018.  
US growth is expected to pick-up, even prior to 
factoring in any stimulus package from President-
elect Trump.   
Having recovered from its weakness in 2013, Euro 
Area growth has been steady over the past two 
years (although growth remains weak by historical 
standards). Political and economic stability 
concerns remain including ongoing questions over 
some EU banks, nowhere more so than in Italy.  
Unemployment remains high ± 10% in the Euro 
Area ± and without major reform it is difficult to see 
how this will fall significantly in the next few years.   
Overall, global economic conditions remain finely 
balanced. The IMF believes that a complex mix of 
economic realignment, structural challenges and 
new shocks will lead to subdued growth, and 
increased uncertainty, in the short-term.  
The risks are judged to lie to the downside, largely 
due to ongoing vulnerabilities in emerging 
economies.  
Over the past few years, growth in China has 
slowed from around 10% to closer to 6.5%. 
Toward the end of 2015, there had been concerns 
of a hard landing. Those fears have diminished 
somewhat, although growth continues to depend 
upon rising levels of credit which poses a risk to 
medium-term sustainability. 
Global inflation remains relatively subdued 
following the fall in oil prices in 2014±15.  
Following two years of over-VXSSO\WKHZRUOG¶V
leading oil producers have finally responded with 
plans to cut production to put a $50-a-barrel floor 
under the price of oil and push it towards $60. 
Prospects to go much above seem remote, 
particularly with continued efficiency improvements 
in US shale operations. Even then, a price of $60 
is a much more attractive proposition for 
6FRWODQG¶V1RUWK6HDSURGXFHUVWKDQWKHORZRI
below $30 in January 2016.  
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Chart 4: Purchasing Managers Index (PMI) for UK  
 
Source: IHS Markit 
* Above 50 = expansion of activity, below 50 = contraction. 
 
 
Chart 5: External uncertainty Deloitte survey of chief 
finance officers ± ³XQFHUWDLQW\YKLJK´ 
 
 
Source: Thomson Reuters Datastream 
 
 
Chart 6: Investment intentions slowing for next 12 months 
± %DQNRI(QJODQGDJHQWV¶VXUYH\WR4 
 
 
Source: Thomson Reuters Datastream 
 
 
The UK economy 
The UK economy ± and consumer spending in 
particular ± has held up remarkably well following 
the EU referendum.  
Most forecasters, including the Bank of England, 
predicted that demand would slow materially 
during the 2nd half of 2016, although there was 
admittedly considerable uncertainty around such a 
judgement. 
Initially, survey indicators of economic activity fell 
markedly to levels consistent with a sharp fall in 
output. They have however, re-bounded strongly.   
Measures of uncertainty also spiked after the 
referendum, and such uncertainty had been 
expected to remain elevated in the near term. But 
they too have returned to more normal levels.  
Since then, any slowdown in growth has been less 
severe than those indicators initially suggested. 
The UK economy grew by 0.5% in Q3 2016, in line 
ZLWKWKH2%5¶V0DUFKIRUHFDVWEXWGRZQIURP
0.7% in Q2. 
On balance the UK economy is expected to come 
in close to pre-referendum expectations for overall 
growth in 2016.  
The slowing in Q3 mainly reflected falls in 
manufacturing and construction, although services 
also grew more slowly. In part, this is likely to have 
reflected a weakening in commercial real estate 
with consumer-facing services strengthening 
further. 
Indeed, the key driver of growth in the UK 
economy during 2016 ± as in the past two years ± 
has been in household spending. This had been 
projected to ease in 2016, but the data for the 2nd 
half of 2016 ± including leading indicators such as 
new car registrations and retail sales ± suggest 
that growth has remained robust.  
There is growing evidence that investment 
intentions have slowed. A result supported by 
surveys from the CBI and Bank of England agents. 
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Chart 7: Contributions to average quarterly GDP by 
expenditure (outturn and OBR) forecast 
 
 
Source: ONS & OBR
 
 
Chart 8: Sharp fall in sterling since referendum 
 
 
Source: Thomson Reuters Datastream
 
 
Table 4: OBR forecast, Autumn Statement 2016  
 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 
GDP 2.1 1.4 1.7 2.1 2.1 
change +0.1 -0.8 -0.4 0.0 0.0 
Consumption 2.8 1.2 1.1 2.1 2.0 
change +0.4 -1.0 -1.0 +0.1 +0.1 
Business Investment -2.2 -0.3 4.1 5.3 4.1 
change -4.7 -6.3 -1.8 -0.2 -0.3 
CPI Inflation 0.7 2.3 2.5 2.1 2.0 
change 0.0 +0.7 +0.5 +0.1 0.0 
Unemployment (% rate) 5.0 5.2 5.5 5.4 5.4 
change 0.0 +0.2 +0.3 +0.1 +0.0 
Source: OBR  
* Italics are change from March forecast 
 
 
There is little evidence of Brexit-induced 
uncertainty depressing day-to-day spending thus 
far. Part of the reason has been ongoing growth in 
house prices ± particularly in London and the 
South East ± which has helped to support 
household spending.  
Households had also been benefiting from 
improving real earnings boosted by relatively low 
inflation at the start of the year.  
But this is likely to change in the months ahead 
with inflation to increase sharply as import prices 
rise. Since the referendum, the value of the pound 
has fallen significantly ± and is now around 15% 
lower than where it started 2016.  
This has helped to boost exports and returns on 
financial markets (with overseas earnings 
benefiting from the lower value of the pound).  
However a sharp depreciation is a double-edged 
sword. By lowering real earnings, higher inflation 
will erode livings standards and hit household 
spending hard over the next couple of years.  
The UK economic outlook 
As highlighted above, most forecasters have 
revised down their predictions for the UK economy 
for 2017 and 2018. However, there remains 
considerable debate over the scale of the 
slowdown, the timing of any Brexit-impacts and the 
extent of the risks involved.  
This, as the OBR took great pains to point out in 
their Economic & Fiscal Outlook, stems from 
IRUHFDVWHUVEHLQJµOLWWOHWKHZLVHU¶ZLWKUHJDUGWRWKH
8.*RYHUQPHQW¶VQHJRWLDWLQJVWUDWHJ\IRUWKH
terms of exiting the EU.  
Based on this uncertainty, most forecasters have 
had to make a number of important judgement 
calls. The most important of which is when the UK 
will actually trigger Article 50.  
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Chart 9: OBR growth forecast ± downward revision for 
2017 & 18 from lower investment and consumer spending 
 
Source: OBR 
 
 
Chart 10: Inflation forecast to pick-up and be above 
target of 2% until 2020 
 
Source: Bank of England
 
 
Chart 11: Forecast comparisons ± OBR more optimistic 
 
Source: OBR, Band of England, HM Treasury  
 
 
 
As we highlighted in our July 2016 Economic 
Commentary, it is important to distinguish between 
the short-term and the long-term (more structural) 
implications of Brexit.  
Most economists predict that once the UK has left 
the EU, it will face a more challenging environment 
for trade, labour mobility and investment as we 
become less integrated with our largest trading 
partner.  
Productivity ± the key to long-term prosperity ± 
may also be weaker if leaving the Single Market 
reduces competition, skilled migration, inward 
investment and financial integration.  
There will however, be opportunities. Businesses 
will find new markets and sectors to operate in and 
policy may change.   
The short-run dynamics are more complex and 
uncertain. Businesses will not ± and cannot ± 
adjust their plans overnight. They may put off 
major decisions until the final settlement is known, 
but day-to-day domestic trends in demand are 
likely to be of more immediate significance. 
In looking at the near-term outlook, most 
economists predict that on balance, growth will 
slow in 2017 and 2018.  
Higher levels of uncertainty are likely to lead to 
some investment being postponed or cancelled. At 
the same time, the fall in Sterling ± Chart 8 ± will 
feed through to higher inflation which will in turn 
impact real earnings and household spending.  
$JDLQVWWKLV6WHUOLQJ¶VGHSUHFLDWLRQZLOOKHOS
exporters and sectors such as tourism, although it 
will have a negative impact on those more 
dependent on supply chain imports. The stimulus 
from the Bank of England will continue to support 
the economy in the near term ± with no real 
prospect of an interest rate rise soon ± whilst the 
pace of fiscal consolidation has also eased slightly.  
However, the OBR still predict that the UK 
economy will be around £30 billion smaller in 2020 
than they forecast back in March.  
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Chart 12: Potential output and forecast outturn ± 
permanent hit to output since 2010 and gap widening  
 
Source: OBR, BofE, HMT  
 
 
Table 5: UK productivity performance remains dire 
 
Annual % 
change 
Output per 
hour 
worked 
UK productivity was growing at close 
to its historical average of around 2% 
per year in the decade prior to the 
2008-09 financial crisis.  
 
Since then, productivity growth has 
been largely stagnant.  
2011 0.9 
2012 -0.8 
2013 -0.5 
2014 0.6 
2015 0.9 
2016 Q1 0.5 
2016 Q2 0.4 
Source: ONS
 
 
Chart 13: Weak outlook for real household income   
 
 Source: Office for Budget Responsibility 
 
 
 
The OBR are however, slightly more optimistic 
than most forecasters, including the Bank of 
England. And both are more optimistic than the 
average of independent forecasters.  
In particular, the OBR predict near trend growth of 
2.1% in 2019 following a bounce back in activity ± 
something that the Bank is less certain of.   
In the medium to long term, the most important 
driver of growth and living standards is what 
happens to potential output. This is the estimated 
level of activity that the economy can produce 
without rising inflation. The key (but also uncertain) 
driver of potential output is productivity.   
Needless to say, there is greater uncertainty than 
usual around the judgements for the path of 
potential output post-Brexit.  
To the extent that any slowdown is not just a 
normal cyclical change but also a hit to potential 
output ± i.e. from lower investment, reduced 
migration etc. ± the weaker the economy will be in 
the long-run.    
7KH8.¶VSRRUSURGXFWLYLW\SHUIRUPDQFHFDQQRWEH
traced just to Brexit. ,QGHHGLW¶VEHHQDFRQVLVWHQW
feature since 2008. The reasons however, remain 
a source of heated debate.  
Since 2010, the OBR has consistently predicted 
that the UK economy will return to its long-term 
trend productivity growth rate in time. But each 
year this has failed to materialise.    
Weak productivity is the key reason earnings have 
performed so poorly in recent years, and why tax 
revenues have been below forecast. 
With poor productivity growth and rising inflation, 
most forecasts for earnings are dismal. The 
Institute for Fiscal Studies predict that earnings will 
not recover to 2008 levels until 2020 at the 
earliest.  
Coupled with uncertain prospects for employment 
and a freeze in many working-age benefits, the 
outlook for many households will be challenging 
with real income rising just 0.1% points in 2017.  
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Chart 14: Causes of higher borrowing ± Brexit and other 
factors 
 
 
Source: OBR 
 
 
Table 6: Changing UK Fiscal Rules  
Previous Rules  
On 
track 
Fiscal Mandate Surplus on net borrowing by 19-20 × 
Supplementary 
Target 
Net debt to fall as % of GDP in each 
year to 2019-20 × 
Welfare Cap Annual limits on welfare to 2020-21. × 
New Rules   
Structural Deficit 
Cyclically adjusted borrowing to be 
below 2% of GDP in 20-21 
9 
Debt 
Net debt to fall as % of GDP by 20-
21 (and not each year) 
9 
Welfare Cap 
Subset of welfare spending to be 
below new cap set for 21-22.  
9 
Source: OBR 
 
 
Chart 15: UK private sector debt high and increasing 
 
Source: OBR 
 
 
The autumn statement 
The combination of a near-term economic 
slowdown and a permanent hit to productivity has 
led most economists to predict a weakening in the 
UK public finances over the next few years.  
,Q1RYHPEHU¶V$XWXPQ6WDWHPHQWWKHQHZ
Chancellor outlined revised forecasts for the public 
finances which included over £120 billion of 
additional borrowing to 2020-21.  
The biggest driver ± around 50% - of this increase 
can be attributed to the weaker economic outlook 
from Brexit. However, it also includes substantial 
revisions to receipts, particularly in 2016-17 and 
2017-18, in the light of poorer tax revenues more 
generally.   
The Statement included a stimulus of around £9 
billion by 2020-21 ± compareGWR0DUFK¶V%XGJHW± 
with a particular focus on productivity.  
The Chancellor is now no longer on track to meet 
KLVSUHGHFHVVRU¶VJRDORIUXQQLQJDILVFDOVXUSOXV
by 2019-20. Indeed, instead of a fiscal surplus of 
£10 billion in 2019-20, the OBR now forecast that 
the UK will be running a deficit of £20 billion.  
In response, the Chancellor opted neither for a 
large stimulus nor more austerity (at least for now) 
and chose instead to abandon the fiscal rules. 10 
RIWKH8.¶VILVFDOUXOHVVLQFHKDYHQRw 
either been broken or abandoned.  
7KHQHZORRVHUµILVFDOPDQGDWH¶LVWRUXQD
cyclically adjusted deficit of less than 2% of GDP 
by 2020-21. Based on current forecasts rather 
than be seen as a tight constraint on borrowing, it 
is more akin to an upper limit ± with around £26 
billion spare in case the outlook deteriorates. 
Much of the recent debate has centred upon the 
scale of public debt ± at nearly 90% of GDP. Of 
perhaps greater concern, and much less 
discussed, is the recent return to growing levels of 
private sector debt. Indebtedness of this scale ± 
particularly amongst households ± has the 
potential to pose long-term structural challenges, 
particularly if earnings remain weak.  
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Table 7: Scottish Budget: 16-17 to 20-21 (real-terms in 
16-17 prices)  
 
16-17 17-18 18-19 19-20 20-21 
£ million (16-17 prices) 
RDEL £26,088 £26,112 £25,624 £25,271 £25,219 
Change on 16/17 £24 -£463 -£816 -£869 
Cumulative change  20/21 on 16-17 -£2,124 
CDEL £ 2,891 £ 3,042 £3,187 £ 3,330 £3,386 
Change on 16/17 £150 £296 £438 £494 
Cumulative change  20/21 on 16-17 £1,378 
 Source: Fraser of Allander
 
 
Chart 16: Scottish Government Resource Budget 
Outlook   
 
 Source: Fraser of Allander 
 
 
Chart 17: Scottish Government Capital Budget Outlook  
 
 Source: Fraser of Allander 
 
 
 
 
The autumn statement and Scotland  
7KLV\HDU¶V$XWXPQ6WDWHPHQWKDGLPSRUWDQW
LPSOLFDWLRQVIRUWKH6FRWWLVK*RYHUQPHQW¶V%XGJHW
± DQGVHWVWKHVFHQHIRUWKH)LQDQFH6HFUHWDU\¶V
statement on the 15th December.  
Under the new fiscal framework, the Scottish 
budget now depends upon a complex mix of grant 
from Westminster and devolved tax revenues.  
Prior to the Autumn Statement, there was 
considerable uncertainty as to what the Chancellor 
may choose to do to departmental spending 
across the UK ± and therefore what this may might 
mean for the Scottish block grant.  
In the end, he chose to largely follow the plans of 
his predecessor George Osborne ± which implies 
DFXWWR6FRWODQG¶V%ORFN*UDQWRIDURXQG
between 2016-17 and 2020-21. 
7KHH[DFWVL]HRI6FRWODQG¶V%XGJHWZLOOQRZDOVR
depend upon how well Scottish tax revenues 
SHUIRUP$V&KDUWKLJKOLJKWVLI6FRWODQG¶VWD[
revenues grow more quickly than in the rest of the 
UK ± as they have done on average since 
devolution ± the Budget will be larger than it would 
have been without tax devolution (and vice versa).  
6FRWODQG¶V%XGJHWRXWORRNZLOORIFRXUVHDOVR
depend upon the tax policy choices of the 
government ± which based on the SNP manifesto 
amount to around £200 million by 2020-21 on 
devolved taxes on top of £100 million from 
changing council tax bands.  
)DUJUHDWHUDUHWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VVSHQGLQJSODQV
Taking just pre-announced commitments in health, 
police and childcare for example, implies real-
terms cuts of between 10-13% by 2020-21 for 
µXQSURWHFWHGDUHDV¶ 
The Chancellor did announce a further boost to 
capital investment ± a cumulative £800 million of 
new consequentials between 2016-17 and 2020-
&RXSOHGZLWK6FRWODQG¶VQHZERUURZLQJ
powers of £450 millLRQSHUDQQXP6FRWODQG¶V
capital budget could be back above 2010-11 levels 
for the first time by 2020-21.  
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Chart 18: Scottish Economic Performance ± lagging the 
UK 
 
 Source: Scottish Government 
 
 
Chart 19: Challenges in manufacturing linked to North 
Sea ± sustained falls in output since 2014 
 
 
Source: Scottish Government
 
 
Chart 20: Drivers of Quarterly Change ± Services making 
greatest contribution to overall growth 
 
 
Source: Scottish Government
 
 
 
Recent Scottish economy data 
The most recent official data on the Scottish 
economy covers the period to June 2016.  
It shows that the Scottish economy returned to 
growth ± with output up 0.4% in Q2, an 
improvement on the -0.0% in Q1.  
Underlying growth is likely to have been stronger. 
Longannet power-station closed in March and 
reduced output by approximately 0.2%.   
However, the gap between Scotland and the UK 
continues.  
Manufacturing grew 0.8% over the quarter but 
remains down 3.6% over the year and over 5% 
since early 2015. The sectors most directly tied to 
the downturn in the North Sea remain weak. 
Construction continues to return to more normal 
levels. As we highlighted in July, according to the 
official statistics, construction grew by 35% 
between Q2 2013 and Q2 2015. Setting aside any 
concerns about the data, growth of this scale 
cannot continue indefinitely. Unsurprisingly 
construction fell 3.0% in Q1 and 1.9% in Q2. 
Thirdly, the all-important services sector continued 
to grow and was the key driver of the change in 
output. Q¶VILJXUHRIFRPHVRQWKHEDFNRI
growth of 0.5% in Q1 2016.  
Finally, on closer inspection, we find that ± in 
addition to Longannet ± two sectors had a 
disproportionate impact on the quarterly results.  
Firstly, the Professional, Scientific, Administrative 
& Support Services sector grew 3.6% in the 
quarter. 
Secondly, there was a (huge) 7% increase in the 
output of the Water Supply & Waste Management 
sector in Q2. This is a very small component of the 
overall economy (just 1.3% of total output) so 
normally changes here have little impact on the 
overall rate of growth.  
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Chart 21: Expenditure components of nominal GDP ± 
households remain most important factor  
 
Source: Scottish Government 
 
 
Chart 22: Investment back at pre-financial crisis levels in 
Scotland  
 
Source: Scottish Government & Fraser of Allander Calculations
 
 
Chart 23: Savings Ratio continues to fall with the ratio 
slightly lower in Scotland than in the UK as a whole  
 
Source: Scottish Government & Fraser of Allander Calculations
 
 
But on this occasion and taken together, these two 
sectors contributed around 0.5% to the overall 
growth rate of the whole Scottish economy ± so in 
effect, without these volatile sectors, growth would 
have been virtually flat (or negative) once again. 
The Quarterly National Accounts for Scotland 
publication shows that investment (Gross Fixed 
Capital Formation) was the main contributor to Q2 
growth - up 5.2% in nominal terms from the first 
three months of the years. As Chart 22 shows, 
investment in Scotland had been lagging behind 
the rest of the UK recently, but has been growing 
more quickly in recent months.   
Whilst the contribution from net trade was positive 
during the quarter, this was only the second time in 
the last six quarters where it boosted rather than 
contracted output. Manufacturing exports are down 
5% on the year.  
2YHUDOO6FRWODQG¶VGHFOLQLQJH[SRUWSHUIRUPDQFHLV
of considerable concern and a key challenge for 
policymakers.  
Growth in household spending remains ± on 
balance ± the most consistent driver of growth in 
the Scottish economy.  
,QWHUHVWLQJO\6FRWODQG¶VHVWLPDWHGVDYLQJUDWLR
remains much lower than for the UK. If this reflects 
some households using up savings in order to 
support consumption, and this is before inflation 
increases and employment prospects become 
more uncertain, then it may not bode well for future 
growth prospects.  How this interacts with current 
relatively high levels of household indebtedness 
will be worth watching.  
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Chart 24: Employment & Unemployment: Jul-Sep 2016 
 
Source: ONS, Labour Force Survey 
 
 
Chart 25: Inactivity Rates: change over year 
 
Source: ONS, Labour Force Survey 
 
 
Chart 26: Changes for Men and Women: Last 18 months 
 
Source: ONS, Labour Force Survey 
 
 
 
The Scottish labour market 
Our new report ± Scottish Labour Market Trends ± 
aims to provide a detailed quarterly discussion of 
developments in the Scottish labour market.  
This highlighted that on most headline indicators, 
6FRWODQG¶VODERXUPDUNHWFRQWLQXHVWRSHUIRUP
relatively well in what continues to be a 
challenging economic environment.  
6FRWODQG¶VXQHPSOR\PHQWUDWHLVRQFH
again lower than that for the UK (4.8%).  
Although it has slipped back slightly over the past 
18 months, employment in Scotland remains close 
to record highs.  
However, some of these more positive statistics 
hide a number of more challenging trends. In 
particular, the recent sharp fall in unemployment 
appears to stem, not from people finding work, but 
from people leaving the labour force.  
Indeed, whilst unemployment has fallen by 38,000 
over the year, employment actually fell by 12,000 
(both 16+). At the same time, inactivity increased 
by around 54,000 (16-64).  
Inactivity rates had been relatively stable since the 
end of 2012, but they have increased over the past 
18 months.  
Women account for much of the rise. The increase 
in female inactivity of over 50,000 (16-64) 
coincides with falling unemployment (-19,000) and 
employment (-32,000) (both 16+) over the past 18 
months. This could, in part, be driven by a 
reversion to trend. Female inactivity had been 
falling up until the start of 2015.  
Interestingly, a similar result is evident in the rate 
of underemployment in Scotland.  
Underemployment in this context refers to the 
proportion of people, in work, who would like to 
work longer hours than they currently do at the 
same rate of pay. Whilst it has fallen back to 2011-
12 levels, underemployment remains much higher 
than before the 2008-09 financial crisis.  
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Chart 27: Underemployment (hrs) rate: 07-08 to 15-16  
 
Source: ONS, Annual Population Survey 
 
 
Chart 28: Hours Worked & full-time share pre-recession 
average: 07-08 to 15-16  
 
Source: ONS, Annual Population Survey 
 
 
Chart 29: Productivity levels in Scotland remain weak 
 
Source: Scottish Government 
 
 
 
A feature of recent years has been an increasing 
more to part-time employment. Indeed over the 
past decade, over two thirds of the growth in total 
employment has been in part-time work.  
Of those in part-time work, around 1 in 7 indicate 
that the key reason that they took such work is that 
they cannot find full-time work (up from 1 in 10 a 
decade ago).  
Concerns about the number of people in 
temporary work have gained attention in recent 
months. 1 in 3 temporary workers currently say 
that the main reason they are in such employment 
is because they cannot find permanent work, up 
from 1 in 4 a decade ago.  
Moreover, not only is the share of employment that 
is full-time lower than its pre-financial crisis 
average, mean hours worked are also lower.   
Taken together, these indicators suggest that the 
rapid rise in employment, which has been a key 
feature of the Scottish labour market in recent 
times, may be masking underlying challenges in 
terms of the type of employment being created.   
Productivity in Scotland has barely improved since 
2010 ± although it has fared slightly better than the 
UK as a whole.  
7KHSUHFLVHFDXVHVRIWKLVµSURGXFWLYLW\SX]]OH¶
remain a mystery, although there have been plenty 
of explanations proposed ± including low levels of 
investment in the public and private sectors, 
limited investment in R&D and innovation, poor 
DFFHVVWRILQDQFHLQKLELWHGµFUHDWLYHGHVWUXFWLRQ¶
processes as a result of financial sector 
restructuring, and the nature of recent 
technological developments.  
If Scotland is to meet the challenges of Brexit, then 
tackling this relatively weak performance ± and its 
drivers such as a lower propensity to export and 
internationalise, poor levels of investment, lower 
innovation etc. ± will be key. 
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Chart 30: Consumer Confidence in Scotland and the UK  
 
Source: GfK 
 
 
Chart 31: Inflation key driver of confidence in Scotland. 
&RPSDUHGWRODVW\HDUGR\RXWKLQNSULFHVZLOO«  
 
Source: GfK
 
 
Table 8: Permanent Staff Placements: 2016 
 µQRFKDQJH¶ Scotland  UK 
Jul 47.1 45.4 
Aug 53.3 51.1 
Sep 55.2 51.0 
Oct 49.8 54.6 
Source: IHS Markit
 
 
Table 9: PMI Scotland and the UK 
 µQRFKDQJH¶ Scotland  UK 
Jul 49.2 47.3 
Aug 49.1 53.1 
Sep 51.2 53.8 
Oct 50.6 54.6 
Source: IHS Markit
 
Outlook  
$VLQWKH8.6FRWODQG¶VLPPHGLDWHHFRQRPLF
outlook will largely be shaped by the prospects for 
household spending.  
In general, there has been a gradual easing in 
levels of consumer confidence in Scotland. The 
market research GfK index (where 0 = balance) 
was -9 in November, implying consumers are 
pessimistic about the outlook.  
Unsurprisingly, the prospects for higher inflation 
DUHEHJLQQLQJWRZHLJKRQSHRSOH¶VPLQGVZLWKDQ
increasing number of consumers expecting prices 
to rise rapidly through the course of 2017.   
$XVHIXOµVRIW-LQGLFDWRU¶IRUODERXUPDUNHW
conditions is the IHS Markit Jobs Report. August 
and September were strong months ± and better 
than the UK ± but October saw falls in both 
permanent and temporary posts.  
Wider business surveys also paint a mixed picture.  
The IHS Markit PMI for Scotland has been 
relatively weak since mid-2015. It indicated that 
output contracted marginally in July and August, 
but bounced back in September - driven by the 
sharpest increase in new business intakes since 
August 2015 ± before slipping a little in October.  
Overall, the PMI has showed a weaker economic 
performance in Scotland than for the UK as a 
whole even before the EU referendum.  
The latest RBS Scottish Business Monitor for Q3 
2016 did contain some evidence of resilience in 
the Scottish economy over the summer ± fuelled 
by a boost in tourism.   
33% of firms reported an increase in the volume of 
business, compared to 30% who witnessed a fall. 
A similar split was found in terms of expectations 
for the next six months.  
The North East continues to lag Scotland as a 
whole with 40% of respondents reporting falling in 
business activity.  
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Chart 32: RBS/FAI Business Monitor shows mixed signals 
 
Source: Fraser of Allander/RBS Scottish Business Monitor
 
 
Table 10: Latest Nowcasts for Q3 and Q4 for Scotland 
 Q3 Q4 
Quarterly Growth 0.32% 0.37% 
Annualised Growth 1.28% 1.50% 
Source: Fraser of Allander 
 
 
Chart 33: Oil and Gas optimism 2010-2016: Still negative 
but picking up from record lows 
 
Source: Fraser of Allander/Aberdeen Grampian Chambers 
Commerce 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Similar results were found in the latest Scottish 
Chambers of Commerce survey ± with relatively 
fragile levels of performance and optimism in most 
sectors.  
To make better sense of all this, and to provide an 
up to date assessment of the performance of the 
Scottish economy, we produce a monthly 
µQRZFDVW¶RITXDUWHUO\JURZWK
www.fraserofallander.org.  
In estimating our nowcasts, we make use of a wide 
variety of different data sources, including the 
latest business surveys and up-to-date information 
RQ6FRWODQG¶VODERXUPDUNHWDQGRWKHULQGLFDWRUV 
On balance, our nowcasts suggest that going on 
the available suite of current evidence, the Scottish 
economy has continued to grow at a relatively 
stable (but slow) pace through the second half of 
2016. Combined with published data for the first 
six months of the year, this points to growth of 
around 1% for the year as whole.  
As in recent Fraser Economic Commentaries, the 
outlook for Scotland will depend markedly upon 
the prospects for the oil and gas sector.  
We are now entering the third year of the current 
low oil price cycle. Investment has fallen around 
40% from its 2014 peak and exploration levels 
remain low, with only six exploration wells spudded 
so far this year. Oil and Gas UK estimates that the 
sector is now supporting around 120,000 fewer 
jobs across the UK supply chain than it did just two 
years ago. 
There are some signs however, that the 
restructuring in the sector may have helped 
mitigate ± at least in part ± recent declines.  
Business confidence remains negative but has 
stabilised relative to recent record lows.  
Our judgement is that the outlook for the North 
Sea is slightly more positive ± or at least less 
negative ± than in July and this provides a modest 
positive uplift to our forecasts for the overall 
Scottish economy since July.  
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Chart 34: Scottish and UK output per head ± Scotland 
behind UK recently but gap not as stark as for total GDP  
 
Source: Fraser of Allander 
 
 
Table 11: Changing labour market measures: last 12 
months 
 
Employment 
Rate  
Unemployment 
Rate 
Inactivity 
Rate 
Scotland 73.6% -0.6% 4.7% -1.3% 22.6% +1.6% 
UK 74.5% +0.7% 4.8% -0.5% 21.7% -0.3% 
Source: ONS, LFS
 
 
Chart 35: Wages, employment and tax revenues per 
capita, Scotland as % of UK  
 
Source: Fraser of Allander 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Outlook for Scottish tax revenues 
A number of tax revenues and powers are in the 
process of being transferred to the Scottish 
Parliament.  
Most notably, revenues from Non-Savings Non-
Dividend income tax is being devolved in time for 
April 2017, together with the ability to vary rates 
and thresholds. 
Under the new fiscal framework, the size of the 
Scottish budget will now depend on how well 
Scottish devolved taxes per head fair relative to 
their equivalent counterparts in the rest of the UK 
(rUK). If they grow at the same rate, the Scottish 
budget will be no better or worse off than it would 
have been without tax devolution.  
However, even small differences in relative tax 
growth could equate to large budgetary effects 
over the course of several years. For example, if 
per capita Scottish tax revenues grew just 0.35 
percentage points more slowly than in the rUK per 
annum, this could leave the Scottish budget 
smaller by £250m in 2020 relative to what would 
have been the case under Barnett.   
Output per head provides a useful proxy for 
relative performance but the key drivers of income 
tax revenues will be the employment rate and 
growth in wages.  
$V KLJKOLJKWHG SUHYLRXVO\ 6FRWODQG¶V HPSOR\PHQW
has been weaker than for the UK as a whole over 
the past 12 months. 
During the past two years, the median wage of 
Scottish workers has also grown more slowly than 
the median wage of rUK workers. 
What is arguably more important than median 
wages for income tax revenues is the wage growth 
of higher income earners, as they contribute a 
disproportionate amount of income tax.  
Here, between 2015 and 2016 wage growth at the 
90th percentile in Scotland grew at half the rate of 
the 90th percentile in rUK (1.3% v. 2.7% 
respectively). 
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 Table 12: Median (full-time) gross weekly earnings 
 
Scot UK CPI 
 
Earnings  change Earnings change  
2014 £519.60 2.1% £518.3 0.2% 1.8 
2015 £527.00 1.4% £527.1 1.7% -0.1 
2016 £535.00 1.5% £538.7 2.2% 0.3 
Source: ONS, ASHE 
 
 
Chart 36: Oil and gas contractor average pay: 2014-2016  
 
Source: Fraser of Allander/Aberdeen Grampian Chambers 
Commerce
 
 
Chart 37: Interaction devolved/reserved policy 2017-2018  
 
Source: Fraser of Allander 
 
 
 
 
 
 
One explanation is the downturn in the offshore 
economy. Median wages declined by 5% in 
Aberdeen and 4% in Aberdeenshire between 2015 
and 2016. In the latest FAI/AGCC survey, the 
median average change in pay in the last year 
within the sector was -4.5%. The first time in the 
history of the survey that firms reported an 
average pay reduction. 
It remains to be seen whether these recent trends 
of relatively slower growth in Scottish employment 
and wages continue. If they do, the Scottish 
economy will do well to match the rUK in terms of 
revenue growth per capita for devolved and 
assigned taxes. The Scottish Government is due 
to publish forecasts for tax revenues in its Draft 
Budget on 15th December.  
The Scottish Government may also choose to 
change tax policy. Two major policies have been 
announced for next year ±  
i) to freeze the higher rate threshold in real 
terms and then increase it by no more than 
inflation until 2021-22; and,   
 
ii) to alter the multipliers on council bands E-H, 
raising around £100m for education 
attainment.   
 
The policy to freeze the higher rate threshold (the 
rate at which people start paying tax at 40p) 
amounts to a tax rise for Scottish higher rate 
taxpayers relative to their rUK counterparts. The 
Scottish Government had estimated that the policy 
would raise around £130 million next year, but 
higher inflation is likely to reduce that revenue to 
around £100 million ± assuming CPI is used.  
A quirk of the policy is that higher rate taxpayers in 
Scotland will face a combined income tax and 
National Insurance marginal tax rate of 52% on 
income between the Scottish and rUK high rate 
thresholds (i.e. between approx. £43,500 and 
£45,000). This is because the upper earnings limit 
for national insurance (which remains reserved to 
Westminster) drops from 12% to 2% when 
earnings move into the (rUK) higher income tax 
threshold.  
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
Down > 10% Down > 5% but <10% Down 0% to 5% No change Up 0% to 5% Up >5% but <10% Up >10%
%
 o
f 
re
s
p
o
n
d
e
n
ts
2014
2015
2016
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
50%
55%
0  10,000  20,000  30,000  40,000  50,000  60,000
M
a
rg
in
a
l 
Ta
x 
R
a
te
s
Income Tax National Insurance Combined Rates
Fraser of Allander Institute Economic Commentary, December 2016  
19 
 
Table 13: Latest growth forecasts for the UK economy  
 2017 2018 2019 
Bank of England 1.4 1.5 1.6 
OBR 1.4 1.7 2.1 
NIESR 1.4 2.2 2.3 
European Commission 1.0 1.2 n/a 
IMF 1.1 1.7 1.8 
Oxford Economics 1.4 1.2 1.5 
ITEM Club 0.8 1.4 1.6 
CBI 1.3 1.1 n/a 
Source: HM Treasury 
 
 
Table 14: FAI forecast Scottish GVA growth (%) 2016 to 
2019 
 
2016 2017 2018 2019 
GVA 1.0 1.1 1.3 1.6 
Production 1.4 1.3 1.5 1.8 
Construction 0.5 0.7 0.8 0.9 
Services 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.5 
Source: Fraser of Allander Institute 
 
 
Chart 38: Growth to remain below trend through forecast 
 
 
Source: Fraser of Allander Institute 
 
* Actual data to 2015, central forecast with forecast uncertainty for 
2016 ± 2019 
Uncertainty bands sourced from accuracy of past forecasts 
 
 
 
 
Our forecasts 
Forecasting short-term growth in an uncertain 
environment is always a challenge.   The aftermath 
of the EU referendum is a perfect example ± and 
there is a divergence of opinion over the outlook. 
As in past Commentaries, we report a central 
forecast but use estimated uncertainty bands to 
set out a likely range within which we predict 
Scottish GDP will lie. In our view, and in the 
current uncertain climate, it is this range that 
should be the central focus of discussion rather 
than specific point estimates.  
In other words, it is entirely possible that the 
Scottish economy could grow close to its trend of 
2% in 2017 and 2018 ± as Chart 38 highlights ± 
but our assessment is that the probability of that 
happening is lower than for our central projection. 
The greatest judgement call concerns the timing of 
any Brexit induced impacts. At the time of writing, 
there are significant uncertainties not only in terms 
of the negotiated settlement but the extent of any 
transitional deal or when Article 50 is triggered.  
Given the data this year so far, coupled with our 
emerging nowcasts, we have kept our forecast for 
2016 relatively constant ± up +0.1% to 1.0%.  
The next 3 years ± 2017, 2018 & 2019 
Our central forecast is for growth to remain at 
broadly the same pace in 2017 ± with growth of 
1.1% (up on our July forecast of 0.5%). This is a 
revision of around +0.15% per quarter.  
This, in part, reflects our expectation that the 
strength of the UK economy over the past year ± 
and better forecast outlook ± will exert a positive 
influence in the near term. We are also slightly less 
pessimistic in terms of the outlook for the North 
6HDWKDQLQ-XO\DQGEHOLHYHWKDW$XJXVW¶V
innovative funding scheme from the Bank of 
England will support lending into next year.   
The prospects for DWUDQVLWLRQUDWKHUWKDQµFOLII-
HGJH¶%UH[LWDOVROHDGVXV± on balance ± to 
predict a slightly better outlook for 2017 and 2018.  
-3%
-2%
-1%
0%
1%
2%
3%
4%
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
A
n
n
u
a
l G
V
A
 G
ro
w
th
Forecast
Fraser of Allander Institute Economic Commentary, December 2016  
20 
 
Table 15: FAI revised forecast %-point change from pre-
Referendum forecast by sector, 2016 to 2018 
 
2016 2017 2018 
GVA -0.4 -0.8 -0.7 
Production -0.4 -0.8 -0.7 
Construction -0.2 -0.4 -0.4 
Services -0.3 -0.7 -0.7 
Source: Fraser of Allander Institute
 
 
Chart 39: Contribution to forecast ± slowdown in 
investment and consumption but pick-up in net trade 
 
 
Source: Fraser of Allander Institute 
 
 
Table 16: FAI labour market forecast to 2019 
 
2017 2018 2019 
Employee Jobs 2,467,200 2,505,200 2,543,150 
% employment 
growth over year 
1.2 1.5 1.5 
ILO 
unemployment 
151,100 155,750 166,400 
Rate (%)1 5.6 5.7 5.9 
Source: Fraser of Allander Institute 
Notes:  
Absolute numbers are rounded to the nearest 50.  
1 Rate calculated as total ILO unemployment divided by total of 
economically active population aged 16 and over. 
 
 
 
 
 
These upward revisions need to be put in context. 
Our pre-referendum forecasts were for growth in 
2017 and 2018 of 1.9% and 2.0% respectively.  
Our revised growth projections remain well below 
these levels. Compared to trend growth rates, 
annual growth of 1-1½% is equivalent to a loss of 
around £5 billion by the end of 2019.   
Growth across all sectors is likely to be relatively 
fragile. And output in particular quarters could be 
close to 0 ± making a short technical recession 
possible. Construction will be particularly weak, in 
part due to its continued return to trend following 
strong growth in 2014-15.  
On the components of demand, we expect the 
short-term uncertainty, financial instability, higher 
risk premiums and challenges in the housing 
market, to hit investment over the next three years. 
Consumption will likely start to weaken next year 
as higher inflation, combined with low earnings 
growth, feeds through to household spending.  
Net exports will continue to benefit from the 
depreciation in the pound as will sectors such as 
tourism (though retail could be hit hard).  Whether 
Scottish exporters are in the position of being able 
to take advantage of this competitive boost is open 
to question.  
We expect unemployment to rise gradually toward 
6%.There remains a degree of volatility in the 
labour market data which may materially impact on 
these forecasts.  
Back in July we forecast unemployment could rise 
to 6.5% in 2016. Instead it stands at 4.7%. But this 
fall in unemployment is not from people finding 
work but from people moving into inactivity.  
As discussed in our Labour Market Trends report, if 
the sharp rise in inactivity had instead translated 
into higher unemployment, for the same level of 
employment, 6FRWODQG¶VXQHPSOR\PHQWUDWHZRXOG
now be around 6.3% - close to our July forecast.  
To the extent that any of this rise in inactivity is 
UHYHUVHG6FRWODQG¶VXQHPSOR\PHQWUDWHFRXOGULVH
much more sharply than predicted.  
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Policy context 
 
/DWHURQWKLVZHHN6FRWODQG¶VQHZ)LQDQFH
Minister will set out his first Draft Budget ± the first 
ZLWK6FRWODQG¶VQHZLQFRPHWD[SRZHUV 
This follows major policy interventions by both the 
Bank of England and the UK Government.  
7KH%DQN¶VVWLPXOXVLQ$XJXVW- which included a 
cut in interest rates, further Quantitative Easing 
and a scheme to boost cheap funding for 
businesses and households ± was bolder than 
many had anticipated. It is likely that the Bank is 
near its limits in terms of the support it can provide, 
particularly with the likelihood of a sharp rise in 
inflation in the coming months.  
,QODVWPRQWK¶V$XWXPQ6WDWHPHQWWKH8.
Government chose neither to inject a major 
stimulus into the economy nor to increase the pace 
of austerity.  
7KH&KDQFHOORU¶VIRFXVLQVWHDGFHQWUHGXSRQ
longer-term policies to boost productivity ± 
including a new National Productivity Investment 
Fund which aims to add £23 billion of spending to 
housing, roads, digital infrastructure, and science 
and technology by 2021-22. The intention is to 
DFKLHYHDµVWHS-FKDQJH¶LQSURGXFWLYLW\:KHWKHULW
is possible to achieve a step-change with 
investment equivalent to 0.25% of GDP remains to 
be seen. 
The Scottish Government is likely to be under 
pressure to announce similar productivity 
enhancing initiatives in its Budget, particularly in 
the light of the weaker growth performance in 
Scotland over the past year.  
But the Finance Secretary has little room to spare. 
As discussed in our 6FRWODQG¶V%XGJHW 
report, major spending pressures in areas such as 
health, childcare and the public sector pay bill will 
constrain the resources at his disposal to boost the 
economy.  Furthermore, recent challenges in 
education standards may mean that any money 
that can be freed up is targeted here rather than 
elsewhere.  
The Scottish GoverQPHQW¶VPLOOLRQ*URZWK
Fund does provide an opportunity to support new 
private investment and the Budget should set out 
further detail on how it will operate. The 
reclassification of a number of major infrastructure 
projects ± including the Aberdeen Western 
Periphery Route ± DVEHLQJµRQEDODQFHVKHHW¶ZLOO
however, hit levels of capital investment compared 
to original plans.   
Overall, the Scottish Government is unlikely to 
announce any major departures from existing 
policies. With that in mind, it is absolutely vital that 
the government set out its multi-year spending 
plans as soon as possible. It is simply not credible 
to continue to rely on one-year settlements.  
Which brings us to Brexit.  
Much of the debate, thus far, has understandably 
been on quantifying the potential scale of the 
challenge. Our own modelling ± which accounts for 
exports and imports changing and supply chain 
effects through the rest of the UK ± estimates that 
output will be lower in the long-run.  
Trade opens up businesses to new opportunities 
for exporting and investment; labour mobility 
boosts labour supply helping to increase 
productivity and address demographic challenges 
in countries ± such as Scotland ± with an ageing 
population; competition helps efficiency, product 
specialisation and growth; and financial integration 
deepens and broaden capital markets. 
Where policy can now have an influence is on the 
scale of any impact, which, in turn, depends 
crucially upon the terms of the exit deal and what 
both the Scottish and UK Governments do to 
address the challenges that will then follow. 
$VZHPRYHFORVHUWRWKH8.¶VH[LWIURPWKH(8
therefore, it is essential that discussions now focus 
on the practicalities of what Brexit might mean for 
businesses, sectors and individuals.  
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In our view, this should include ± 
i. Understanding the trade-offs from the 
specific terms of the negotiated exit from the 
EU; 
 
ii. Identifying the sectors and areas of the 
economy ± e.g. international investment, the 
labour market, regional growth etc. ± most 
likely to be impacted by Brexit; 
 
iii. The policy opportunities that may open up ± 
both at the Scottish and UK level ± from no 
longer being bound by EU commitments and 
obligations; and,  
 
iv. Reassessing existing policy priorities and 
commitments, and crucially the delivery of 
WKHJRYHUQPHQW¶V(FRQRPLF6WUDWHJ\LQD
world where Scotland is no longer part of the 
EU. 
None of this will be easy. And even with strong 
policy responses and a good outcome in the 
negotiations, the economy will still face headwinds. 
Whilst it is understandable that the debate thus far 
has focussed on the scale of the impact of Brexit, 
the political fall-out from the referendum campaign, 
and the potential constitutional implications both in 
Scotland and the UK, it is critically important that 
our policymakers now move quickly to find 
solutions and develop strategies to respond to the 
challenges (and new possibilities) that Brexit 
presents. 
Here lies an opportunity, albeit one created out of 
difficulty rather than success. Many of the 
challenges that Scotland will face in a world where 
the economic environment will ± as a result of 
Brexit ± be more growth-inhibiting rather than 
growth-supporting ± have been around for 
decades. 
:HNQRZWKDWZHPXVWLPSURYH6FRWODQG¶VH[SRUW
performance, boost levels of innovation in our 
economy (both in R&D and also in work 
environments), re-balance the industrial structure 
of our economy, focus on long-term value added 
rather than short-term profit, provide greater 
opportunities for all of Scotland to benefit from 
growth, and build an economy that tackles poverty 
and poor quality work. 
Brexit will not make any of this easier, far from it. 
But with the right ambition and focus within policy 
circles there is an opportunity to use the challenge 
thrown down by Brexit to take a fresh look and, 
perhaps undertake a more honest assessment, at 
KRZEHVWWRDGGUHVV6FRWODQG¶VORQJHUWHUP
economic challenges (and to take advantage of 
new opportunities that will emerge) in the years 
ahead. 
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